The Anglo-American and Israeli-American security relationships have proved to be unusually close and have confounded expectations that they would wither away with the changing international environment. In order to explain this, the article proposes a theory of 'alliance persistence' that is based on reciprocity over shared geostrategic interests, sentimental attachments and institutionalized security relations. The article employs this theoretical framework to explore how Anglo-American and Israeli-American relations have developed during the Obama administration. It argues that the Anglo-American relationship has been closer because of the two countries' shared strategic interests, whilst the Israeli-American relationship has experienced divergences in how the security interests of the two sides have been pursued. The article concludes by assessing how the two relationships will fair in the post-Obama era and argues that there are numerous areas of tension in the US-Israeli relationship that risk future tensions.
Introduction
The US has multiple 'Special Relationships' by virtue of the fact that it is a global superpower and its interests overlap with those of many countries around the world. The term 'special relationship' has been overused: so far US Presidents have acknowledged twenty importance of shared interests. However, shared interests do not necessarily strengthen their relationship if there is no reciprocity in advancing such interests. Reciprocity is a key element of a persistent alliance. As will be explained in the next section, a lack of reciprocity between Israel and the US has weakened their relationship during the Obama era, despite these two countries having many interests in common across the Middle East.
A state's utility may take a number of different forms: it may be geography, they may share a common adversary or a stronger country may see its ally as a buffer against an enemy's expansion. The stronger power may be able to offer protection and security, without which the survival of the weaker state could be endangered. The weaker state may add a small but significant capability that makes a difference to a larger ally. The degree of utility a state can offer determines whether it is considered by its ally as a strategic asset, a strategic irrelevance or a strategic liability. A state is a strategic asset if it helps its ally to achieve foreign policy goals. By contrast, a state is a strategic liability if it serves as a hindrance to its ally's foreign policy goals or as a strategic irrelevance if it proves to be neither useful nor harmful.
The second factor is the extent to which allies share sentimental attachments. This refers to a state's favourable feelings or affection towards its ally at both the societal and the elite level.
The extent of the sentimental attachment determines the strength of collective identity between them. Identity is a socially constructed phenomenon and helps to shape how policymakers see the world and who they regard as like-minded partners. It not only defines who we are, but also delineates the boundaries against the others.
10 Collective identity is important, because it is 'the sense of us' that enables states to define their common interests in a particular manner.
11
Collective identity can derive from a number of sources. It can arise from a sense of shared heritage and historical experience, from common language, cultural affinities or religion.
Alternatively, it can develop from shared political attributes such as democratic systems of government or market economies. Usually, for a strong bond to develop between two countries, a mix of factors overlap with one another. In addition, patterns of cooperation are vital contributors to a strong collective identity between states. Wendt uses the term 'cooperative acts' to describe the influence of behavioural practice on the formation of collective identity. He argues that repeated cooperative acts have two effects on the formation of collective identity. First, 'By showing others through cooperative acts that one expects them to be co-operators too, one changes the intersubjective knowledge in terms of which their identities are defined'. 12 Second, through repeated cooperative acts, 'Actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other -to see themselves as a "we" bound by certain norms'.
13
Collective identity helps to build patterns of understanding and trust that undergird the relationship and give it durability during times of tension. 
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Yet the US has been unable to draw on Israel's strengths against common enemies for fear of damaging coalitions that include Arab states. For example, the Israeli Air Force, which is recognized as amongst the best in the world, 31 has played no role in operations against IS.
The two sides also differ in the significance they attach to terrorist threats from the region.
Israel views Hamas and Hezbollah as the primary challenges to its security whilst the US 
Sentimental attachments within the AASR and the IASR
The US, UK and Israel are liberal democracies with a shared commitment to universal suffrage, the rule of law, human rights and market economics. As two Anglo-Saxon countries with a common history and language, sentimental attachments have contributed to a strong War. 43 Despite all of these warnings of impending doom, the elite level relationship emerged largely unscathed from these experiences. This was partly because public opinion within the US was against military intervention and the crisis was defused by the negotiated removal of the offending weapons from Syrian territory.
In contrast to the strengths of the AASR, the IASR has suffered from the poor personal chemistry between a Democratic President, Barack Obama and a right of centre Israeli Prime formalizing the regular exchange of nuclear information, nuclear technology cooperation as well as the transfer of nuclear warhead-related materials. 73 There are a series of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) through which the main patterns of cooperation are conducted and these are supplemented by sub-JOWOGs as well as other specialized forms of collaboration. 74 The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) provided the basis for the UK to acquire the American Trident D5 missile system, to which it fits its own warheads and produces its own submarines. The Cameron government re-affirmed the Blair government's decision to renew Britain's nuclear deterrent by purchasing a successor missile system from the US. 75 In expectation of that development the decision was announced to invest £500 million in upgrading the nuclear submarine facilities on the Clyde.
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In comparison, it is much harder to discuss IASR nuclear cooperation because it remains shrouded in secrecy: Israel maintains a policy of neither confirming nor denying its nuclear status. The fact that the US assisted the Israeli nuclear programme in the past and made available its test facilities makes it reasonable to suppose that collaboration has continued.
With American support, Israel has managed to maintain its nuclear weapons without them The US and Israel, as well as the US and UK, embed officers in the militaries of the other side; they send personnel to attend the other's academies and they conduct joint training and exercises. 79 According to Oren, 'In areas as diverse as weapons development, joint training .. and educational exchanges, the cooperation was superb'. 80 America's pivot to Asia may weaken the strategic dimensions of the AASR to some degree, given the fact that the UK will have less to offer its ally in that region. Nevertheless, the UK has distinctive historical relationships in parts of Asia -including Australia, Hong Kong, Washington. 97 But it leaves behind a legacy of mistrust that will be difficult to overcome. In addition, Palestinian issues will continue to plague the IASR and split American public opinion. It will be more difficult for Israel to enjoy bipartisan support in Washington on issues related to American vital interests, especially if Israel is only loved by half of the US.
Recent tensions such as these have exposed the immaturity of the IASR. In future, the US and As regards the future of the institutional dimension, it will continue to generate 'stickiness' within both special relationships. In the case of the AASR, the UK will have to work harder to preserve the intimacy that resulted from conducting military operations alongside each other in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to prevent their militaries from losing this closeness and drifting apart, the UK will need to train and exercise with its larger ally and preserve the bonds of friendship that were generated in the recent past. In his memoirs, former Chief of Within persistence, relationships vary. It would be misleading to suggest that the AASR and IASR are equally close relationships and that neither had changed. The UK enjoys a closer relationship with the US than Israel and it has been subject to less deterioration over time.
The UK's geostrategic interests remain closest to those of the US as they share the ambition to uphold a Western-led order. The security relationship between the UK and the US is based on a shared assessment of global security risks; itself the product of an intimate institutional dialogue between their defence and intelligence officials. The UK is eager to support the US's role as a provider of security and is willing to contribute, both materially and politically, Israel. The US will not abandon Israel, there are too many domestic pressures preventing this, but is likely to be more discerning in the future about the lengths to which it will go to support its ally.
